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The primary objective of the Social Sciences Group is to im-
prove the state-of-the-art of technology transfer. Main focus is
on those manifestations of advanced technology to be found within
NASA's Technology Transfer Division. It is apparent, however,
that the process of technology transfer transcends organizational
demarcations. Much that can be learned about the process and must
be fed back so as to implement the policy which Rives impetus to
NASA's applications programs can be derived from empirical research.
Work in the field supplies the real-life dimensions to programs
conceived in response to a higher order or level of imperatives.
When, for example, we observe the transfer of technology from one
federal agency to another, as in the case of the move of Landsat
to NOAA, we find an array of unanticipated consequences that will
have important impacts on both the process and outcome of the
transfer. When the process is studied from the viewpoint of the
ultimate recipient, we find a set of expectations and perceptions
that will figure more in a final assessment than do the attributes
of the technology being transferred. It is clear that, in the
process of technology transfer, the technical issues and elements
are fairly clearcut and are amenable to customary procedures. Less
well known is how to link a technology with a community of potential
users. Essentially, this is a question basic to our research ac-
tivities, report of which fcllows.
2NASA-NOAA Transfer
In a White House Press Release (November 20, 1979), President
Carter assigned to NOAA management responsibility for civil opera-
tional land remote sensing satellite activities. NOAA's new chal-
langes were manifold. In the first place, the task was technical,
command and control of Landsat Multi-Spectral Scanner and Thematic
Mapper data. It also involved the dissemination of Landsat data
as well as its archiving. In the second place, the task was or-
ganizational and conceptual -- a requirement unprecedented in its
dimensions. NOAA was to provide the transition between a government-
developed technology and some future delivery system; it was to help
design the institutional framework for that future delivery system,
whatever its sponsorship: private, semi-private, or government.
This instance of technology transfer was considered especially sig-
nificant because it may serve as a model for endeavors of a similar
nature.
In essence, NOAA was asked to develop the organizational struc-
ture and processes needed to expedite transition between government-
sponsored R&D and creation of some "final" delivery system. Because
of the precedent-Setting propensities of this pioneering effort, we
have found it important as a case history, so that its salient fac-
tors may be documented for future reference and analysis.
Brief Historical Review of Landsat
In 1972 the United States launched its first experimental re-
mote sensing R&D satellite. Within five years efforts were underway
to establish a remote sensing system. In 1977 S.R. 657 was intro-
34
duced to that end. It was opposed by the Administration, however,
'
	
	 as premature. In 1978, President Carter issued two presidential
directives. The first, PD 37, dealt with classified and non-clas-
sified areas of satellite remote sensing and the second, PD 42,
dealt with civilian space policy; it mandated an increase in private
sector investment in satellite remote sensing. In conjunction with
these directives, the Office of Science and Technology Policy under
Dr. Frank Press had two studies carried out. The first, Integration
Study, addressed the potential. savings from integrating classified
and non-classified systems for remote sensing. The second, The
Private Sector Involvement Stud 	 exploredSt y,
	 	 potential private sec-
tor involvement in an operational remote sensing satellite system.
In an attempt to bring pressure or, the Administration to take
action toward establishing, an operational remote sensing system,
Senators Stevenson and Schmitt introduced two separate bills which
would create an earth resources information service based on an
operational remote sensing satellite system. In 1978 Senator
Stevenson introduced S.663, proposing to create the Earth Data
Information System as an operational service within NASA for an
interim period of 7 ,years in order to develop institutional, fi-
nancial, technical and marketing capabilities. This proposal would
allow for an evolutionary process in which the technology and in-
stitutional arrangements would develop over time. In 1979 Senator
Schmitt introduced S. 875 to create the Earth Resroices Information
Corporation by establi^king a private corporation which would be
regulated by the FCC. Testimony for these bills generally debated
the merits of "getting on with it" and letting the market forces
create an economically efficient system for delivering remote sen-
sing data. Opposing arguments concerned problems associated with
freezing institutional arrangements when the technology was under-
going change and the market not yet identified.
I
4
Administration witnesses reiterated the need for future
studies and sensitivity to timing while industry witnesses re-
Iterated the need for assurance of continuation and for an
operational system with some identifiable institution in charge,
whether it be a government agency or a private investment agency.
The results of the Private Sector Involvement Study indicated
that the private sector, although interested in participating,
was not yet prepared to make the level of investment necessary
to suppor':, a remote sensing 7 jstem. The study recommended that
the Administration not select any option at this time but "make
clear its readiness to entertain proposals." In 1979 President
Carter directed NASA to transfer Landsat to NOAA ,end directed
NOAA to prepare an Interim Transition Plan.
Background for the 'Tran s ition
Several considerations motivated the current interest in
moving Landsat out of the experimental phase into an operational
applications phase. 1
 The first two are regulatory in nature:
1) NASA does not have statutory authority to carry out an opera-
tional space applications program and can only carry out research
and development activities. Because Landsat services appear to
have many potential domestic and international benefits which
can only be fully realized if Landsat becomes fully operational,
there has been increasing Congressional pressure to move Landsat
into a fully operational phase. If Landsat is to become opera-
tional, either NASA's mandate must be expanded or Landsat must
be transferred to a separate organization. 2) International
regulations distinguish between experimental and operational
frequency bands. If Landsat 1,2, & C become fully operational,
they will be functioning on the wrong bands because they were
designed to operate on experimental frequency bands. Landsat
D, however, has been designed to use the operational frequency
5band; this implies the need for an institutional framework to
support it when it becomes functional.
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The third and fourth considerations are institutional in
nature: 1) Except for administration assurances, there has been
no institutional commitment to an operational program which would
take up where the experimental Landsat program leaves off; 2) a
transition plan has not yet been successfully implemented. With-
out assurance of continuation and a viable transition to an opera-
ational system, it is hard to Judge the potential level of market
support and to estab l ish a pricing policy, since neither private
investors nor public sector organizations are willing to invest
in a system whose future existence is uncertain. Policy makers
are faced with a Catch-22 situation: without the existence of
ongoing Landsat services, suppliers are unable to Judge the
potential market; but without a sense of the market, suppliers
are not able to determine the level of demand or, in fact, if
the service is a worthwhile investment.
Underlying all of these seemingly straightforward practical
and technical considerations is a much more complex and intract-
able issue. There is increasing evidence pointing to declining
U.S. productivity, a decreasing rate of technical innovation and
a narrowing of our international technological lead in many areas
in which we have been unsurpassed. In space, the U.S. is facing
competition from France, Japan and the European Space Agency.
Awareness of these trends has prompted a poorly articulated
Federal policy to promote technological innovation and stimulate
productivity. Much of the urgency for getting Landsat services
into the private sector is an attempt to transfer a larger share
of the costs to the users in order to show a favorable benefit/
cost ratio for agency research and development generally and for
individual technologies specifically.
The effort to demonstrate productivity can be seen in subtle
alterations of space policy. The National Aeronautics and Space
Act of 1958 established a three-pronged policy, which called for
U.S. space efforts in the service of peace and for the benefit
of all mankind; U.S. leadership in space, science and technology;
and international cooperation. However, the "purity" of these
policy objectives has recently become somewhat muddied. Presi-
dent Carter, in October 1978, issued a statement which inttoduced
some implicit policy modifications to the Space Act by adding
emphasis on "uses of space for practical ,nd economic benefit
... (and encouraging) ... the private sector to taxe an increasing
role in remote sensing and its applications. ,2 These new themes
are a response to the concerns mentioned above and reflect a
general agreement on the need to show a higher benefit/cost
ratio on government research through careful choice of research
areas and through rapid transfer of technology out of government
agencies into the private and public sectors. The transfer of
Landsat services from NASA to NOAA is, in part, a manifestation
of this effort.
If a successful transition is to take place there are some
non-technical problems which must be addressed in order to implement
a fully operational Landsat system. Several of these were identified
in a 1975 report by the National Academy of Science.3
- An institutional arrangement is needed for
delivering Landsat services for the interim
period between the present experimental phase
and a fully operational phase.
- The potential market for Landsat data remains
largely unidentified and undeveloped. It is
disaggregated, scattered, and primarily a mar-
ket of future users.
mechanism exists for communicat-
9s of potential users to developers
and suppliers.
- rhere is no assurance of ongoing service
delivery because to date there has been no
successful implementation of provisions for
continuing satellite development after feasi-
bility has been demonstrated.
The NOAA transition plan is an attempt to respond to many of
these problems. However, several pivotal. assumptions are buried
in NOAA's response.4
- Remote sensing technology will yield social
and economic benefits and should thus be ac-
cessible to domestic and foreign users.
- Private sector ownership and operation will
lead to increased social welfare to the ex-
tent that the private sector is better able
to supply services efficiently; is better
able to market more aggressively; is better
able to stimulate innovation, development
and technology transfer; and can be more re-
sponsive to user needs.
- There already exists a potential market which
is willing to assume some level of risk in-
vestment; however continuing government/
industry cooperation is necessary.
Several conflicting observations can be noted.5
- Motivation for private sector investment tends
to be dampened by Federal policy of open access
to data.
8- There is a conflict between the profit motive
which drives private sector investment and
public good aspects of remote sensing which
cannot be captured by the private investor.
Private ownership of a U.S. Landsat system
would bring private firms into direct com-
petition with foreign governments.
- In the past government agen► ,ies have nego-
tiated international involvement in remote
sensing and there is no experience which
leads us to believe that industry-based ne-
gotiations will be possible.
- The private sector generally neglects long
range research and development issues. In
fact, this has been borne out by experience
in commercial communication satellites.
The Transition Plan
The NOAH Transition Plan, entitled "Planning for a Civil
Operational Land Remote Sensing Satellita System: A Discussion
of Issues and Options '(June 2J, 1980), is a proposal for an in-
terim institutional framework for delivering Landsat services.
This is eventually to be replaced by private ownership and opera-
tion. The question that might usefully be raised at each step
is: will the proposed activity lead to achievement of the under-
lying policy goals? We might begin by examining the input-output
model, which although convenient, is not appropriate.
Throughout the transition plan, policy makers have been
guided by an input-output model of the process. They have then
taken the next step and assumed that the analytical characteristics
of the model can be applied to the real-world process. This is a
case of using a model to provide insight into a complex process
and then falling into the trap of believing that characteristics
of the model in general are true of the case in particular.
9NOAA policy makers, having adopted an input-output model,
then identified a list of inputs and outputs which, appropriate
to the model, could be manipulated as policy variables. Input-
output models have some convenient features. If the process is
understood, planners can maximize output. All inputs can be ex-
changed at the margin until the contribution of all inputs is
equal. When this is achieved, resources are allocated in their
most efficient distribution and social welfare is improved. The
inputs and outputs NOAA chose were a vague set of economic indi-
cators which were supposed to function as surrogates for a complex
process. From this flowed a set of assumptions about the way
people will behave.
Here, some general observations on the role of indicators
in model-making might be apropos. The validity of an indicator
is determined by whether it measures what it is supposed to
measure. The choice of what to measure is, however, based on
a concept of the process one is trying to understand or manipu-
late. Is it a good concept or model?, i.e., does it simulate
the right aspects of the process? Again, what is selected to
be in the model reflects the policy-makers' values6 As a con-
sequence, although a model can simulate the way the world really
works, it usually simulates the way the people think the world
should work or the way it would be convenient for it to work.
In the present case, the model is an input-output model which
through manipulation of the ratio of inputs can be made to be
efficient. The underlying beliefs are that improvements in
economic efficiency will lead to increases in social welfare
and that private sector participation leads to increased ef-
ficiency.
willingness-to-pay
 
and to take rinancial risk are the inputs and
various technical capabilities are the outputs. NOAA's emphasis
on willingness-to-pay,to assume economic risk,and to identify
technically detailed user needs in the operational period im-
plies an understanding of the process of technological innova-
tion and the process for improving productivity. However, for
technological innovation and basic research, the results are
often not physical output, but ather the conceptual input into
some other process. The notions of input and output are not ap-
propriate when applied to research and technclogical innovation.7
It is the process and social context which are important. 8
 Research
reveals that there are no good models for the process of innovation
and productivity. There are no objective measures to assess tech-
nological innovation.
Not s urprisingly, NOAA's policy goals are so vague and value-
laden as to elude a workable answer to the question asked earlier:
will the proposed activity lead to their achievement? For example,
the transition plan states that NOAA should "ensure that the opera-
tional system meets (user) needs to the maximum extent possible,
given user willingness to reimburse ..." How could NOAA know if
it were approaching a maximum or if tomorrow's efforts were bet-
ter than today's? What measure would NOAA use? The transition
plan states that NOAA should operate a system that "responds to
programmatically justified user priorities". How would NOAA know
if one set of criteria were better than another for ranking needs
with respect to the first policy goal of meeting user needs to the
maximum extent possible? NOAA is to implement the President's
goal by "pursuing appropriate pricing and market expansion efforts."
Again, these are vague and evaluative policy objecti.es that imply
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that it is possible to tell if you are doing better today than
you were yesterday, that the process has identifiable inputs
which lead to measurable outputs. These words and the under-
lying concept indicate that the model of science and techno-
logical innovation does not accurately desc-ibe the process
NOAA is trying to improve.
The Transition Plan states that in aedition to managing
the technical system NOAA should carry out four activities,
each of which we will now examine in detail.9
(1) "Evaluate the data rei
evaluate the data requirements
who the future users will be.
must have clear operative goal
respect to those goals. These
case of innovative and rapidly
juirements of users." In order to
of users, the evaluators must know
Additionally, the future users
s and understand their needs with
assumptions are rarely met in the
changing technologies.
Much of recent organizational theory tells us that an or-
ganization's operative Loals or its day-to-day procedures for
producing its product or service are developed Li response to
available technolcgy. ip System goals, however, may remain con-
stant and Independent of technology. For example, the system
goal of a hospital may be to cure illness. How this is carried
out on a daily basis depends on how the hospital staff concep-
taalizes the nature of disease and the technology available to
It. Changing notions of disease have interacted with available
technology and resulted in a variety of methods for "curing"
illness. Thus, although an organiz.aL on may have a clear system
.	
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goal, its operative goals appear to develop in some iterative
fashion with the available technology. The formulation of its
operative goal -- how to produce its product or service --
largely determines which needs are specified.
An example using Landsat data will demonstrate. Resource
managers had an operational goal, which can be stated as "to
allocate efficiently available resources toward controlling fire."
Once resource managers learned that remote sensing could provide
data on vegetation patterns which could be superimposed on slope
data, they could use this new combination of information to al-
locate resources for selectively cutting vegetation in order to
control fire. The operational goal did not dictate the need for
either information on vegetation or slope. Once the combination
of information was available, then managers recognized the new
capacity and developed a slightly modified operational goal:
efficient allocation of resources toward clearing vegetation
as a means for fire control, and as a result, they had a clearly
defined need for this new tyre of data. 11 Needs identification,
operational goals and technology^ appear to be iterative and inter -
dependent. So the requirements of users largely emerge as a re-
sult of being a user, future users may not know who they are or
what their needs will be.
One of the interesting observations about technical inno-
vation is that the organizations which appear most able to use
a new technology are not among the first to recognize the new
applications or enter the new markets. A recent example of this
phenomenon is the current microprocessor revolution. The small
Innovative firms developed the new applications of microproces-
sors, recognized the undeveloped markets, and produced pocket
calculators, personal computing systems and digital watches.
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This is largely because the organizational structure required
for efficient production of standardized products and services
is not the arrangement of people needed for taking advantage of
new technology and new markets. Relying on current users to
develop an understanding of the needs of future users for a tech-
nology which will not be fully developed for several years will
result in an understanding of needs that reflects past experience
and relies on present values. It will probably be the small
entrepreneureal firms that will recognize the new uses and mar-
kets. They do not exist now because they develop quickly in re-
sponse to new opportunity.
Relying heavily on the evaluation of users'needs may result
in a system which is conservative and backward-looking. The
process runs the risk of being inflexible and unresponsive to
the innovative behavior that will eventually allow the system
to be cost beneficial. The essence of the problem was described
by Dr. Frosch in a NASA Management Colloquim at Goddard Space
Flight Center in 1978:12
The problem is that we are in the business of
producing change; and that leaves us in the
paradoxical position that because we are trying
to produce change, and looking at the history
of change, we rapidly conclude that of course,
the really intere6ting changes are the ones
that are not predictable from past experience.
The ones that are predictable from past ex-
perience, anyone can predict, with the rela-
tively simple prediction mechanism, either
linear extrapolation or fancier forms of
Fourier extrapolation, or decision theory,
or what-have-you. All of these forms of
extrapolation suffer from the difficulty
that you can only extrapolate for a time
or distance into the future along the curve
which is roughly inverse to the bandwidth
of the problem, to the amount of information
or difficulty or breadth of the problem.
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Since you are usually interested in broader problems,
the predictability is rather short in time. Inter-
esting things happen because there are discontinuities;
because somebody changes the idea of not only how to
solve the problem, but what is the problem to begin
with ...
There is a kind of folklore about how one does appli-
cations, which is common in Washington. It is the
folklore that says "solutions looking for problems are
a bad thing; what one ought to do in the applications
business is find out what the problems are and figure
out how to solve them."
... I think there is good historical evidence that
this sometimes happens but that the solution of exist-
ing problems is usually done whether fairly straight-
forwardly or not at all successfully until something
else changes. It is at least as likely that some
brand-new idea turns up which has apparently relatively
little to do with the stated problem, except that it
will frequently change the problem by abolishing it
and replacing it by some other problem.
The important point Dr. Frosch is making is that the interesting
and important problems will come about because of discontinuities
or because of new conceptions of problems. Any simple prediction
or extrapolation into the future will identify only the most ob-
vious straightforward solutions to relatively simple problems.
To the extent that the operational Landsat system is designed
to respond to the expressed needs of current users or even to the
predicted needs of current users, the system will be less able to
meet the needs of INture users. To the extent that the operational
system is inflexible and designed explicitly to address present
problems, the system will be less able to supply the information
required for addressing the problems which will arise out of
discontinuities and the redefinition of problems.
The process NOAA uses now to identify users and user needs
will determine who the future users will be. This is the case
because the system which will be put in place will be designed
to respond to the users which will have been identified. Who
15
the users are now appears to be determining the process by which
NOAA is identifying future users. To ascertain user needs and
views NOAA sponsored five conferences during March 1980. The
conferences generally presented an overview of the present
Landsat program and described the future roles of NOAA and NASA
with respect to the transition period. User needs were assessed
through group sessions and a questionnaire. A report on the
conferences and analysis of the questionnaire were prepared by
Metrics, Inc.
The number of people who attended the conferences was small
and the sample was heavily weighted in favor of government repre-
sentation. Forty-eight percent of the total number of registered
participants attended the Washington conference, and only 38'.91
of the participants of all five conferences were from private
industry or non-profit organizations. Additionally, companies
frequently sent multiple representatives so the total number of
participants overstates the extent of industry representation.
The main needs assessment tool was the questionnaire, which
asked for technically detailed information, and much of it in-
quired about user needs after 1988. The questions required the
user to understand clearly present and future needs for Landsat
data and in several cases to understand the alternatives avail-
able. In fact, the questions could only be answered by people
who were already active users with well-defined needs. For
example, in Part I users were asked for their highest priority
programmatic category after 1988; optimum and minimum spatial
resolution and spectral bands in the operational period; data
acquisition areas and times and operational delivery times;
proportion of services which users would have purchased at
various prices. The narrative section of Part I asked for
changes and/or new products which they now required or would
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require in the future and a description of their research and
development needs not presently being met. Part II referred
explicitly to needs in the operational period and asked for
performance parameters, relative importance of satellite
data to the organization, optimal and minimal values for spatial
resolution; estimate of the number of MSS scenes to be acquired
annually, and the proportion of scenes which would be acquired
on computer compatible tapes and the proportion on film.
The answers to these questions assume a clear idea of how
the organization will use Landsat data eight years into the future.
Few businesses know what their product mix will be eight years
into the future, or what prices they will be willing to pay for
the factors of production. Some very innovative and rapidly
evolving industries, like the microprocessor industry, cannot
even tell what generic products they will be producing in a year
or two. No matter what kind of statistical analysis is carried
out on the answers to these questions, it can only be based on
the information that is there, not on information that is omitted
(which is often much more important). Statistical analysis over-
emphasizes the value of specifically what is known. Drawing
inferences about user needs from such a small sample of specific
bits of information is poor statistical practice and misleading
as a guide to policy.
The f ormat of the questionnaire forced respondents to ap-
pear more certain than they were and to present qualitative in-
formation in numerical or quantitative form. In order to respond
sensibly to the questionnaire the user had already to be an active
consumer of Landsat services. Any inferences made about user
needs in gener,l derived from this type of surveying will protect
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the status quo because it overemphasizes the needs of established
users, particularly those who are large and have clearly iden-
tified needs. But this outcome is contrary to current Federal
policy to encourage innovation and productivity; it responds to
and supports what exists now, what is needed now, not what will
exist, what will be needed. Dr. Herbert Hollomon, Director of
the Center for Policy Alternatives, said in his testimony on
S.1250, "change and response are essential for a dynamic society
... protection of the status quo will only stifle innovation."13
This may be the ultimate protection of the status quo because it
will establish a huge system which has been designed to respond
to that small group of potential users who had clearly articulated
needs in 1980.
Several follow-on interviews with both large and small users
who attended the conferences corroborated the presupposition that
the questionnaire asked for information which users could not
generally supply. This was true especially with respect to the
questions that asked for predictions of technical requirements
during the operational phase and for estimated prices users
would be willing to pay. One respondent characterized the ques-
tionnaire as "vague ... thej expected pat answers ... which is
not possible with a leading edg;: technology." When asked about
his company's ability to predict future technical needs, he
said "We can't make that kind of predictions and cost estimates
... We can't even estimate personnel needs for the next three
years." In fact, planning for user needs based on this ques-
tionnaire is imposing an artificial certainty onto a highly
uncertain response. To the extent that users supplied concrete
responses, it was either because the questionnaire forced re-
spondents to "say something" or because a few respondents had
some current bona fide needs to set forth.
The report on the conferences, written by Metrics, Inc.
and entitled "Overview of Conferences with Non-Federal Users
on U.S. Operational Land Remote Sensing Satellite Program",
stated, "One of the important results of the series of user
conferences ... has been the initiation of a dialogue between
NOAA and land satellite data users (p 26)" This is a conclu-
sion not corroborated by personal contact with participants
interviewed. They felt that NOAA was not listening. One
person said that the questionnaire was an example of a lack
of understanding of the problem. "All this future planning is
irrelevant because what we need is to get the present system
cleaned up and prices must be lower. The field is so new that
we are having trouble convincing most people thAt it is even
a viable thing. In industry there are few people that even
know about this technology, let alone accept it." Another
person felt there was no one at the conferences to whom he
could talk, because their areas of expertise were not his.
(2). " . ensure that the operational system meets their
needs to the maximum extent possible, given user willingness to
reimburse for services and budgetary constraints." There are
two aspects to this activity: (1) the notion of maximizing ser-
vice within identified constraints and (2) basing the level of
service in part on the user's willingness to pay. Both flow
from the input-output model of the process.
The notion of achieving a maximum within constraints assumes
a linear model of the world. Such an approach is only useful
for very simple kinds of problems such as determining the cheap-
est cattle feed given certain nutritional requirements and cur-
rent market prices. Three assumptions must be met in order for
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the model to work: the decision-makers must completely under-
stand the process; they must be able to measure all the inputs
and exchange them at the margin for all other inputs; and they
must be able to calculate and make commensurate the value of all
costs and benefits of all inputs. Establishing the "right"
level of service based on attempts to do these types of calcu-
lations with respect to an innovative and still evolving tech-
nology for which there is not clearly identified market would
result in an arbitrary outcome. Because the assumptions can-
not be met in this case, the process of maximization (even on
a rough conceptual level), given identified constraints, can
only be performed in cursory and token fashion. The outcome
would not reflect the level of service which "meets user needs
to the maximum extent possible given willingness to reimburse
and budgetary constraints" but rather the process of selecting
which information would be included or excluded from the cal-
culations.	 In this case the process would in all likelihood
result in the undersupply of services. Even as an approximation
-- or a good guess -- the process is conservative and backward-
looking because the criteria for selection are the past experience
and current values of the participants. The process, at best,
can only be a simple prediction or extrapolation into the future.
It says nothing about the future needs of potential users,
their experience or values, and it does not recognize the possi-
bility of discontinuities and new problem definitions.
The futility of extrapolating from present trends as a
method of identifying future needs has been discussed by many
current science writers and philosophers. Prigogine points
out "predictable processes are altered by the unpredictable
... in modern science in general, the key discoveries come as
a surprise. The impossible becomes possible." Again in dif-
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ferent words Eugene Wigner says "Every phenomenon is unexpected
... and most unlikely until it has been discovered. And some
of them remain unreasonable for a long time after they have
been discovered." 14
The policy objective underlying the notion of maximization
here is the desirability of generating cost-effective data,
which in the case of a highly complex and still evolving tech-
nology is in direct conflict with the policy objective of promot-
ing innovation as a means to stimulating increased productivity.
The policy objective that a fully operational land remote
sensing satellite system "... be designed to generate cost-
effective data responsible (and ultimately in a self-financing
manner) to a broad range of user requirements" 15 is benefit/
cost analysis in a new guise. Such analysis has been detrimental
to public program planning in general and is disastrous as a
measure of new technologies. It imposes a necessity for pre-
mature evaluation which requires quantification of benefits
which cannot be identified and dictates that the use of remote
sensing data must contribute in an immediately viable cost-
effective way. 16 NOAA plans to improve the cost-effectiveness
of supplying Landsat services by establishing the level of sup-
ply based in part on consumers' willingness to pay. But this
assumes that users can calculate the benefits of using remotely
sensed data compared to alternative methods, and that the clients
or users can also carry out the same types of calculations.
Establishing a future level of supply based on willingess to
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pay today makes some heroic assumptions: that users can cal-
culate the future benefits of using remotely sensed data com-
pared to alternative methods; and that the users know their
future needs and the needs of their clients as well as their
clients' willingness to pay.
In the case of small firms, the push toward cost-effective-
ness and efficiency may have some unin v ended side effects which
will tend to inhibit their growth and success; responsiveness
to new needs and technological innovation may also be discouraged.
Most of the innovative users of remotely sensed data have been
individuals and small firms. The vision has been carried by
consultants, university faculty and small intrepreneurial firms.
Only recently have large companies established their own labora-
tories and exploited the techniques. Indeed, it is still the
small entrepreneurial firms and individuals who are at the cut-
ting edge of the technology.
Nonetheless, the Transition Plan threatens to put small
companies at a competitive disadvantage. Small firms compete
by cutting delivery times in order to be responsive to their
clients' needs. For example, if a small oil company has an op-
tion on a piece of land, it must be able to make a decision in
a few weeks. So, a small consulting firm or image-processing
firm competes by supplying prompt information, which is spe-
cifically tailored to the needs of its customers. They achieve
this by utilizing informal personal and direct telephone com-
munication to EROS personnel. If this system becomes formalized
and these expedient direct channels are blocked or eliminated,
then small firms will be put at a tremendous disadvantage. Even
temporary blockage as a result of having to establish new chan-
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nels of communication in a new organization will work against
them.
The push toward cost-effectivness has two additional side
effects which work to the disadvantage of small companies and
discourage new innovative applications. It increases the cap-
ital cost of processing data and reduces flexibility. Small
companies purchase film and visually inspect it through optical
viewers. The technicians become skilled at visual interpre-
tation and can respond to the particular and specific needs of
their clients. Image-enhancing techniques can highlight and
bring out some predetermined features in an efficient and stan-
dardized fashion, but must be processed by large expensive com-
putors which are usually available only to large companies. So, the
per unit price goes down, but the capital overhead is much higher;
the process is better suited to a preselected set of qualities,
but it less flexible and responsive to a variety of client needs,
and the small producer cannot compete.
(3) "Establish and operate a satellite and ground processing
tasking system that responds to programmatically Justified user
priorities." What is a "programatically Justified user pricrity"?
What are the criteria for ranking user needs or priorities? Which
users are included? How are their needs determined? What time
scale is used? What constitutes system responsiveness? What-
ever this means, it is certain that what is "programatically
Justified" with respect to willingness to pay in 1980 will not
be programatically Justified with respect to willingness to pay
in 1990 or 2000 because the alternatives, problems, goals and
capacities will be different by orders of magnitude. The rationale
for imposing this requirement on a system which is to be operational
in eight years and probably will not come into its own for twenty
years flows logically from the input-output model. The poll-,y
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goals mentioned above would be workable and appropriate if the
process really worked like an input-output model and we under-
stood the process, knew what the inputs were and how to measure
the outputs.
(4) "Implement the President's goal with respect to the
eventual ownership by the private sector of the land remote
sensing satellite system by pursuing appropriate pricing and
market expansion efforts, and establishment of a satisfactory
institutional framework based on the private sector's willing-
ness to invest and share in the risk." 	 This ambitious and
vague objective can be separated into three parts: a) the
final goal of eventual ownership by the private sector; b) the
means of achieving this through appropriate pricing and market
expansion activities; and c) establishment of a satisfactory
institutional framework based on willingness to invest and to
share risk.
In each case we need to ask what model of human behavior,
or organizational behavior or economic theory do we have in mind.
Are these models based on theoretical azsumptions or do they
require necessary conditions in order to have descriptive or
predictive power? Are the conditions met in this case? And
does our common sense understanding of human behavior mesh with
these models?
a) The goal of private sector ownership. Should the private
sector have access to and control of the production of world wide
data and should the government have to purchase it from the pri-
vate sector? More generally in terms of the overall problem of
transition technologies -- of moving technology out of government
research and development envirun.-ents into the public sector --
what characteristics should z Lechnology have in order for it to
be a good candidate for private sector control of production
and distribution? In the present case, there are some awesome
implications for centralization of power in the hands of a small,
unelected group of people. Our system of government is not
generally responsive to public good issues. It is however ex-
tremely sensitive and responsive to the interests of organized
groups. Although stated in extreme form, the question we must
ask is do we want the private sector to hold the government hos-
tage. To the extent that ti'! private sector is in control of
the production of essential data, it has influence on the legis-
lative process. Leaving aside the clearly nefarious possibilities,
the drift toward more centralized control of a highly powerful
information source should raise serious questions. It is not
clear that the advantages of increased economic efficiency which
theoretically accompany.private ownership outweigh the disadvan-
tages of centralizing power in the private sector.
b) The means of implementing eventual private sector own-
ershi p by pursuing appropriate pricing and market ex pansion ef-
forts. This goal refers to the importance of prices as a prac-
tical implement in the search for productive efficiency. However,
this assumes both the possibility and desirability of approaching
"productive efficiency" as a means to increasing social welfare.
The economic theory that drives this position and the under-
lying assumptions that must hold if the conditions of efficiency
are to be met will be briefly summarized as follows. The logic
of the necessary conditions for economic efficiency flows in one
direction only: it is true that if A exists then B follows; it is
not true that if B exists then A will follow. It is true that
when economic efficiency exists then resources should be allocated
according to prices; however, it is not true that if resources are
allocated according to price an economically efficient situation
will be produced.
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The main assumption is that the "purpose of economic ac-
tivity is to provide consumers with the goods and services
they want and that the criterion for performance is efficiency".1
Efficl,°T­ y refers to whether resources are allocated optimally
and is based on the Pareto criterion which states that resources
are allocated efficiently if no one can be made better off with-
out making someone else worse off. Theoretically, economic ef-
ficiency can be broken down into four separate conditions which
must all be simultaneously met. The goods produced by the
economy must be the ones consumers want; all available resources
must be used and there must be efficiency in production and ex-
change.
Efficiency in production means that given the available
resources and technology as much of each commodity should be
produced as possible without reducing the output of other com-
modities. This means that the factors of production should
always be used where they are the most productive, where the
ratio of benefits to costs is highest. When efficiency exists
then the relative price of any pair of commodities indicates
the rate at which the production of one commodity can be in-
creased by one unit as a result of using the resources released
when the production of another commodity is reduced by one unit.
Efficiency in exchange or in distribution is achieved when
goods are distributed to ',n-- consumers who want them and all con-
sumers are willing to exchange one unit of a given commodity for
a unit of another at the same rate. This automatically happens
if all consumers buy commodities at the same price. Then the
rate at which they are willing to exchange one commodity for
another is equal to the ratio of their prices.
e
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Under conditions of economic efficiency, the rate at which
consumers are willing to exchange a unit of one good for a unit
of another is the same for all consumers and is equal to the
ratio of their prices In the market; the rate at which a unit
of one good can be transformed into a unit of another (in the
production process) is equal to the ratio of the factor prices
in the market; consumer sovereignty exists; and all resources
are used to capacity. Economic efficiency exists only when the
"tradeoff rates of certain benefits (or costs) are the same for
all economic agents"ls.
Given economic efficiency, then the rate at which consumers
are willing to exchange a unit of one good for a unit of another
and the rate at which a unit of one good can be transformed into
a unit of another is equal to the ratio of their prices. And the
price a consumer is willing to pay for one good in comparison to
other good indicates the level of supply consumers want. When
these conditions are met, the right level of production is
achieved, i.e. social welfare is maximized; resources are dis-
tributed optimally. Therefore, when efficiency exists, the
price consumers are willing to pay is a good guide to an alloca-
tion of resources;' this is consistent with optimal social welfare
and the right level of production. However, the reverse is not
true. Allocating resources based on the price people are willing
to pay does not automatically lead to more efficiency nor to an
increase in social welfare. This is because prices are not al-
ways available and there are no prices for many types of exter-
nalities. Allocating resources based on price in the market
place in the absence of overall +3r ejc!jency will not by itself
result in a better distribution of resources with respect to
increasing social welfare.
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Part of the confusion arises because the policy objectives
and the human values supporting them are not clearly 4_dentified.
The policy goal of creating an "operational system" is to create
a stage in a process of technological development -- a particu-
lar point in the technological and organizational development
of remote sensing technology. The goal in this case is a means
not an end and in the present case the ends are as yet unspecified.
c) The establishment of a satisfactory institutional frame-
work based on willingness to invest and share risk. Institu-
tional framework here refers to the collection of organizations
which will make up the "operational system". Perhaps the authors
of the Transition Plan also meant to include the collection of
organizations and policies. However, this discussion will be
limited to the structural  linkages between people and organiza-
tions.
Management r•e c;ponsibility for the operational land remote
sensing program will be assigned to the National Earth Satellite
Service (NESS), which would be a major line component within
NOAA. The Transition Plan states that NESS will be "organized
to ensure adequate attention to policy formulation, regulation,
relations with users and private industry, and internation^.1
activities related to land remote sensing." At the same time
NESS will continue to manage the Civil Meteorological Satel-
lite System and the National Oceanic Satellite System. Although
technology transfer is a relatively new field, an increasing
body of evidence suggests that both in the case of policy im-
plementation and technology transfer, the structure of thv
receiving organization is an important variable bearing on the
ease and success of imalementation or transfer.
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The Transition Plan has not dealt with the actual structure
of the new NESS. Important details have yet to be clarified: how
will NESS be organized to ensure adequate attention to policy
formulation? Will policy formulation with respect to the land
remote sensing program create conflict for personnel who are
also professionally committed to the meteorological satellite
system or to the proposed National Oceanic Satellite System (NOSS)?
Will the organizational structure allow the staff to relate to
each other in a way which facilitates the transfer or will the
structure create interpersonal relationships which hinder the
transfer? For example, if the new responsibilities create role
conflict or situations where individuals have new or inappropriate
discretion, then the structure will have created personnel re-
lationships which may hinder transfer. It is almost a truisim
that how people relate to one another within the implementing
organization is determined by the organization's structure and
is crucial to the success of a program. NESS is being asked to
wear many hats, yet attention to how NESS personnel are going
to carry out their complex and potentially conflicting tasks
is completely lacking. Besides policy formulation, NESS must
direct its attention to regulation, relations with users and
International activities. Each of these activities is complex
and potentially in conflict with the other activities. For
example, international cooperation may easily conflict with the
profit motive of domestic users.
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Interagency coordination will be achieved at the Assistant
Secretary level by a Program Board, which will be composed of
representatives from eleven different agencies: Defense, In-
terior, Agriculture, Energy, State and Commerce, NASA, EPA, AID,
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the CIA. This Board is to
provide "continuing Federal coordination and regulation in such
areas as: 19
• Policy issues related to the civil land
remote sensing satellite program;
• NOAA's management of the civil land re-
mote sensing satellite program;
• International negotiations;
• Priorities among the data requirements
of the Federal and rather users;
• A sat«j;llite and ground processing task-
ing system;
• Data and pricing policies;
• Proposals for private sector involve-
ment;
• Private sector regulation;
• Federal budget requests;
• Relationships with other Federal data
sources; and
• Necessary research and development.
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When NOAA's management decisions ?re "at variance" with the
Program Board's, then any member of the Program Board may
refer the issue to the Policy Review Committee on Space.
A word on the planned procedures is in order here. Experience
with technology transfer indicates that a collection of dis-
parate and conflicting agencies could probably not reach con-
sensus in any one of the eleven policy areas mentioned above.
As it stands at present, a structure such as the one proposed
by NOAA is designed to encourage continual discussion, conflict,
appeal, more discussion and more conflict followed by more ap-
peal.
Although we cannot see into the future and predict the
course of the new Administration with respect to science policy,
there are some clues in the thoughts of Simon Ramo, 20
 who is
currently the co-chairman of Reagan's Science and 11'echnology
Task Force. Ramo believes that "the climate for innovation can
be improved by better decision making and more leadership at the
Federal level ... (that) ... innovation is often hamstrung by
disagreements over ... pressing issues, typically between cor-
porations on the one hand and politicians and their constituents
on the other." One might wonder how well the present Tran-_
sition Plan can correct these problems. So far, it has created
on paper an organizational structure likely to increase advocacy,
undermine consensus, and highlight conflict of interest. Our
research with the Pacific Northwest Project showed how diffi-
cult it was to reach consensus on technological needs even when
the participants had common interests and were motivated by an
overall common goal. To require consensus from groups with con-
flicting interests and goals when the technology is immature,
the potential market unidentified, and the users' needs unde-
n
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termined seem-, impossible. Indeed such a coordinating struc-
ture is exactly the arrangement Ramo seems to believe hamstrings
Innovation.
Even the best programs fail without careful attention to
implementation. That this phase of the transition occupies a
position of low prior':y can be seen in the document, "Planning
for a Civil Operational Land Remote Sensing Satellite System".
This document is in the form of a standard policy analysis and contains
history, problem definir.ion, development of a few alternatives
which represent various levels of commitment, statement of pros
and cons associated with the alternatives, and discussion of
the policy trade-offs implied. Out of a total of119 rages
(which were publically released prior to the budget hearings),
discussion of the actual implementation of the Interim Opera-
tional System is covered in seven brief and somewhat oblique
and confusing paragraphs. The "when," "what" and "where" ques-
tions are addressed but the controlling "how" question is com-
pletely ignored. This observation is particularly noteworthy
because the lesson to be learned from NASA's experience with
technology transfer is that success depends on careful atten-
tion to the detailed aspects of how it is going to be done.
Analysis of the report's seven paragraphs devoted to im-
plementation indicates that the underlying model of the transfer
process is incomplete. "Implementation of the Interim Opera-
tional System" refers to "transfer of functions." Generally
"implementation" refers to how a policy is put into place, or
in this case a technology. "Transfer" refers to what has hap-
pened. By equating "implementation" with "t:oansfer" the diffi-
cult question of how something is going to be accomplished becomes
transformed into the simple question of what is to be accomplished.
By equating "implementation" with "transfer", the authors beg the
question of how the technology (operation of Landsat D) will be
transferred from NASA to NOAA. Specifically, the report states
Implementation of the Iterim Operational Sys-
tem will require transfer of the function of
archiving and dissemination of standard data
products from the EROS Data Center (EDC) in
the Department of the Interior and of hard-
ware and personnel from the National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration (NASA).
Implementation means how these functions will be transferred not
that they will be transferred.
The last two paragraphs of the section on implementing the
Interim Operational System begin to address some of the "how"
questions.
NASA will transfer to NOAA available positions
from the Goddard Space Flight Center and from
its Office of Space and Terrestrial Applications,
which provide current civil service support for
the management of operational aspects of the
Landsat Program, the tasking of Landsat satel-
lites and the interface between operational
users and the Landsat program.
But this does not take into account the personal dimensions of
the transfer process. Will people carry the information and be
the vehicle of technology transfer or will positions be trans-
ferred? These dimensions take on particular importance when
we look at how users interact with NASA personnel. The users
interviewed generally agreed that the system was made workable
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for them through interaction with specific people in NASA who
understood their particular problems. There was the general
belief that the delivery system was Just beginning to function
well, and that much of that success had to do with the indi-
vidual attention and direct personal communication between
NASA personnel and users.
The notion of the transfer process as depicted in the Plan
is one of shifting around boxes on an organizational chart, re-
allocating funding, and declaring that functions have been trans-
ferred: the program is implemented! Like most policy analyses,
detail is specified where it is easiest and best understood
and as a result,.the controlling types of interactions are
left unidentified.
In summary, NOAA policy makers expectations and perceptions
as to how to link technology with a community of potential users
appear to have some unanticipated consequences. These may be
detrimental to the broader policy objectives of promoting tech-
nological innovation and improving productivity. In the present
case the expectations and perceptions on the part of both the
supplying and receiving organizations play a far more important
role in the transfer process than do the attributes of the tech-
nology being transferred. When the process is studied from the
point of view of the end user, these expectations and perceptions
take on special significance because they control the final out-
come.
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Through cooperative effort, NASA and NOAA are attempting
to make these expectations and their consequences explicit and
to use this new understanding in shaping the transfer process.
An upcoming regional conference in April on user needs is be-
ing sponsored by NASA and will be followed by a day with NOAA
personnel. This is an interesting example of the dynamics of
the NASA-NOAA transition and may provide an opportunity to ob-
serve the technology transfer process at work.
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Information and the Decision-Making Process
The process of assessing the information needs of users
of remote sensing is complex, elusive, and difficult. None-
theless, it is of vital importance, since it lies close to the
heart of NASA's concerns. Better understanding of the attri-
butes of data likely to be incorporated into decision-making
would help NASA plan for advanced technical systems as well
as improve delivery systems. NASA needs to assess users'
needs for its own process of validation and evaluation. As
a vital step in technical planning, monitoring, and projection,
validation is a sine gua non. As an essential program component,
management tool, and budgetary justification, evaluation is the
Re plus ultra. They are, in fact, embedded in the policies
,relating to civil operational remote sensing:
• A national civil operational land remote
sensing satellite system should ensure
continuity of data and the appropriate
reliability and timeliness of standard
data products;
° User requirements, projected levels of
demand an the cost of meeting these
requirements should determine the de-
sign of the operational system.
Note the underlined terms above. They reflect the assumptions
that someone knows what the proper definition of reliability
is, how appropriate is appropriate, and understands user require-
me.%;,^ well enough to project demand. In point of fact, these
maters come under the heading of RED -- they have still to be
demonstrated.
cents were ques-
tions underlying much of the research done in this segment of
our work. We were well aware of the view prevailing at NASA
headquarters of some of the shortcomings of the current process
for assessing user requirements, conventional wisdom being that
it was ad hoc, deficient in follow-up, low in credibility, and
dependent sometimes on unrepresentative participation. We knew
that it was criticized as a process which used varying metho-
dologies. We knew NASA headquarters' version of a desirable
user requirements process was one which was "continuing, insti-
tutionalized, systematized, representative; visible and directly
addresses OSTA objectives for both RED and user development."
It is useful to have official goals and objectives clearly
articulated. However, our work in the field points to the fact
that they are at this point so generalized as not to be con-
sistent with the real world of resource management. Because
of its diffuse and changing nature and because of the many as
yet untried applications of remote sensing, it may be leap-
frogging much necessary preliminary spadework and groundbreaking
to think seriously at this point of achieving a user requirements
assessment process that is methodologically sound and representa-
tive for all applications now and future. These are attributes
that can be attained only as a result of the activity; they are
not a precondition for it. Whether the process will be "con-
tinuing, in3titutionalized, and systematized" depends on NASA's
internal organization and management. In their present state,
the goals and objectives are not merely of the apple-and-orange
variety; they are a bowl of mixed fruit salad. As a matter of
ground truth, decision parameters and decision makers' purposes
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are extremely complicated and imperfectly understood. The use
of econometric models, application of decision-making rules,
the socio-economic and political environment affecting decisions,
management style, organizational arrangements, and personal pre-
dilections and prejudices -- all. are determinative factors and
have bear.ng on the ultimate value of the information and its
charac-eristics. They .form an intrinsic part of the process by
which remote-sensing technology will. be accepted and utilized
and its value assessed.
In our work with the NASA-Ames Applications group and also
through our association with the Estes Working, Group on Informa-
tion Utilisation and Evaluation, we have concentrated on the user
requirements component of the technology transfer process. Even
in the early stages, we found user needs assessment to be a highly
variable matter. If the users were construed to be the network
of technical persons already working with remotely-senzed data,
even though they were not the persons responsible for ultimate
incorporation intc decisions, then a fairly straight-forward
"shopping list" could be drawn up. This situation lends itself
to the boxes-with-arrows diagram, attractive in its simplicity,
deceptive in its concretenese,and amenable to the it,odeling that
so often passes for astute management.
The customary way to ascertain user needs is by Means of a
workshop. But such events provide a sound track that is already
well worn. Presentations show and tell but not much that is not
clearly difjla vu. There is a good deal of "singing to the choir,"
and basic issues are lost in the noise of unenlightening dis-
cussion, possibly by the wrong "experts", for participants are
cam; r_ ^ •,
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likely t.. be the technical middlemen and not "users" of the
information. There is a suspicion that they show an inclina-
tion, in definjng their needs, to put in a blanket order for
higher resolution and speedier delivery irrespective of whether
and how the data become information and are put to use. When,
on occasion, res('Arce managers give their views the picture gets
considerably more `cor°Flexified". For example, the Chief of
Planning, California Department of Resources, when asked* how
he would assign priorities to his information needs, in terms
of mapping, predicting, and forecasting replied, "At present,
the data available are better than the models we have. Our data
are pretty accurate; it is the models that are not very good."
The circularity here is unmistakable: in considering user needs,
we concern ourselves with the decision-making process. This in
turn brings us to the role of information in that process. But,
as we pointed our earlier, decision parameters and decision makers'
purposes are extremely complicated and evaluation can be achieved
after analysis on a case-by-case basis. Even then, the assessment
seems to have an orientation more backward than forward-looking,
in that standard cost/benefit procedures are likely to be applied.
While historical perspective is important, cost/benefit analysis
may yield false clues and will certainly not answer NASA's need
to know how it can best respond through advanced technology to
public needs as ,het dimly perceived.
In the current models of assessment of user needs there ap-
pears to be a set of assumptions not supported by experience.
They imply that users are a homogeneous entity that can be tapped.
Actually, users must be developed and it is in their diversity
Robert Rotter, at the Work s hop of Working Group on Information
Utilization and Evaluatic , Asilomar, California, Sept. 61-17, 1980.
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that clues to future generations of technology will be found.
There still exists patent predilection for the simple, one-
dimensional flow chart notion of a "user requirements mechanism,"
when what may be called for is a missionary function to establish
linkages (1) because the technology is sometimes ahead of the
potential users' perception of their needs, and (2) "assessment"
of those needs eludes the quantification and calculation which
constitutes the uni-methodology nostrum but does not fit the
real-world model.
.,-6:.-, 
-f
43
User Needs in Technology Transfer
The process by which NASA fulfills the mandate to transfer
its technological expertise to agencies at various levels of
government and to private industry is the subject of this re-
search. There are a number of different ways in which this
process might be approached. During the summer of 1980, the
Social Sciences Group was involved in an effort to analyze
several possible models for ascertaining the needs of potential
users of Landsat imagery. Working with the Western Regional Ap-
plications Division, we investigated in some detail a means for
dividing the study of technology transfer into a series of se-
quential steps. The starting premise was that in order for NASA
to transfer its technology effectively it must know something
about the technical needs of those who would use the technology.
This assessment of users' needs, thought to be necessarily prior
to the transfer process, was the principal topic of study.
We were aware, of course, that various methods have been
used in the past to ascertain users' needs. The most directly
applicable work had been done by Wilson and Westerlund in their
studies related to the Pacific Northwest Project. In that pro-
ject, NASA's Landsat technology was being made available to a
number of state and local governmental units. An early phase
of that transfer process was an examination of just what those
agencies needed in the way of remotely sensed data. Did they
need data yearly or monthly or daily? What sorts of resolution
and spectral characteristics did they need? The PNP group, having
analyzed the answers to these and similar questions, prepared a
master profile of data requirements to guide NASA in the develop-
ment of Landsat data packages.
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Given the apparent success of this process, the question
arose as to whether there could be some way in which this assess-
ment of users' needs could be routinized for future use in different
settings. Several conferences were held at the Space Sciences
Laboratory and at NASA's Ames Research Center to discuss how
the study of users'needs could be generalized. At first, the
idea was put forward that there be a workshop, to be attended
by NASA managers and technicians as representatives of the
space agency, and similarly situated managers and technicians
from the potential group of users.
After some research, it became apparent that the PNP prob-
ably did not provide an adequate model for future assessments of
users needs because the PNP study was, in some ways, idiosyncratic.
For example, the agencies which were involved in answering the
questions about their data needs had already accepted the idea
of using remotely-sensed data, -- or had been told by executives
of their respective state agencies that they should consider it.
Further, the PNP personnel conducting the study were acquainted
with staff in the agencies; the agency staff people knew the nature
of the technology being transferred; and there was a clear notion
on the part of everyone that the assessment of users' needs was
an important step in moving this particular process forward. A
large element in the PNP was that of acce-ptance, which had to be
developed and nurtured as an instrinsic part of the transfer pro-
cess. If it had been lacking, even the preliminary step of needs
assessment would have been virtually impossible.
Further study suggested that assessment of user needs in iso-
lation from the ongoing process of technology transfer would be
devoid of meaning. How, for example, could criteria for evaluation
be established in a vacuum? How can we determine bona fide "success"?
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It seemed obvious that the only way to evaluate such re-
sults as we might obtain would be to see if those needs informed
and guided a real effort to transfer the technology involved
from NASA to the user. Thjs, clearly, is an interactive pro-
cess which would require monitoring, documentation, and inter-
pretation. In order to maintain an active and cooperative re-
lationship with potential users, it was necessary to consider
the conditions necessary for fostering such a relationship.
For example, could the .investigators offer the assurance that the
givers of technology would or could respond to the needs that had
been expressed? Could the technology meet the stated needs?
What possible incentive would a user have to delineate his needs
if there were no guarantee that the investigators would try to
satisfy those needs? It was hard to imagine asking a busy
manager in a government agency or private firm to devote several
hours or days of valuable time to discussion of needs which he
had no reason to think anyone would try to satisfy.
It was apparent that the study of users'needs could be
carried out only as part of a larger process of studying tech-
nology transfer. That is, the evaluation of the assessment of
users 'needs could be best accomplished with an empirical base,
which might be established through experimentation. An effort
of this kind would, in essence, amount to a simulation of the
real-life situation and would necessarily include all of the
components.
I
	
	 Starting in September, 1980 work began on a small-scale
project to study technology transfer intensively; from the
assessment of needs to the effort to locate an appropriate
r
46
NASA technology for those needs, to the process by which a link
is built between the user and the agency so that the technology
can be efficently transferred. We have proceeded as follows:
A random selection of four small local firms was made. One
firm designs and manufactures stationary solar heating equipment
for residential and commercial applications. Another designs
and manufactures windmills for the production of electricity.
The third potential user is an independent inventor who is
currently designing input devices for graphic display computer
terminals. And the fourth is a non-profit collective of people
who are promoting "soft energy" paths. Each of these potential
users was approached and told of our interest in having them be
"guinea pigs" - potential users of NASA technology. We offered
tc sit down with them for an hour or two to explore their tech-
nical needs. Then a letter to NASA was to be drafted. This
letter, outlining their needs, would stimulate a response from
NASA. How and how soon this reponse occurred, the form it took,
its relationship to the needs -- all are items for observation
and will provide,at the microscopic level, a view of the ways in
which the agency and the user interact. The goal is to assess
simultaneously our accuracy in defining users' needs and provide
the agency with solid information about how to improve its re-
sponsiveness to users of its technology.
Fortunately the four users are a diverse group whose in-
terests span many disciplines. Collectively their needs range
from heat transfer fluids with certain specific characteristics
for viscosity and specific heat to methods for forming fiber
optics into bundles, to a need for the use of NASA wind tunnels
for testing of their devices. Some requests are highly specific,
others very general.
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Already the project has an interesting spinoff. None of
the four companies knew anything about NASA's program in tech-
nology utilization. Even though this is a small sample on which
to base any conclusions, the fact that four out of four randomly
selected users knew nothing about NASA's efforts at technology
transfer has inspired an extension of the research effort. We
are now in the process of making a random selection of 50 to 100
manufacturers, selected from the Thomas Register of Industrial
Goods. Personalized letters are being sent to the chief execu-
tive of each firm with a single question: Are you aware of NASA's
technology transfer program? With such a simple questionnaire
to be anwered, we hope the respondents will return their answers
at a high rate. We can then correlate the answers with some
simple characteristics of the respondents, such as geographic
location, type of product, size of firm, and so on. While this
is not intended to be an exhaustive survey, the findings can
help improve one vital link in the chain of actions which add
up to successful technology transfer, namely, effective communi-
cation.
4'
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NASA's Program for the Elderly and the Handicapped
This study was undertaken as the forerunner to forthcoming
work on certain aspects of NASA's program for the Elderly and tbc-
Handicapped. Its emphasis was, therefore, historical and analytical,
and it emphasized salient features of the present program so as to
derive guidelines for exploration and development of new avenues
of opportunity for service. The year 1981 has been designated
by the United Nations as the "International Year of Disabled
Persons." This recognition of the special needs of a large and
growing sector of the population -- for one may certainly include
the process of aging as having disabling effect -- should give
impetus to NASA's activities.
By way of structure for the research to be carried out last
year, three basic questions were raised:(1) What are the forces
which determine the applications to be developed? (2) How do mar-
ket characteristics affect the choices available to consumers?
(3) What are the personal and social impacts of these new tech-
nologies?
As is usually the case when research into a complex and
relatively uncharted field is undertaken, the six months' effort
indicated that in some instances we may have been asking the wrong
questions, in others that there were not (and could not be) clear-
cut answers. Moreover, our own time constraints and the time fac-
tor that must come into play for impacts to become df.scernible
made answers to the third question virtually inaccessible. This
is not to say, however, that the research did not yield useful
results nor that future efforts need be discouraged. In fact,
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it is on the basis of these findings that we can proceed with
focus sharpened and emphasis more specific.
The first part of the study addressed the question of the
way in which potential applications are selected for development.
NASA's goal was presented in the Directory of the Technology Trans-
fer Division: "to ensure that the maximum possible benefits are
derived from the application of NASA's technology by addressing
national priorities." In the arena of technology for handicapped
and elderly persons, this task was considerably complicated by the
involvement of numerous federal agencies, all with relevant but
not necessarily related missions. Primary among them are the
Veterans and the Rehabilitation Services Administrations, charged
with the responsibility to serve certain sub-groups of the handi-
capped and elderly, such as veterans or persons who are potentially
employable. There are other public agencies whose major concerns
are elsewhere but who, like NASA and the Department of Defense,
allocated some portion of their resources to this field.
Pinpointing lack of coordination as the cause for both dupli-
cation and serious gaps in service, the House Committee on Science
and Technology appointed a Panel on Research Programs to Aid the
Handicapped. Their twc reports (April 1977 and March 1978) pro-
posed establishment of a coordinative body, which, under PL 95-602
(November 6, 1978) emerged as the National Institute of Handicapped
Research, adjunct to the U.S. Department of Education. In addition,
the law created an Interagency Committee on Handicapped Research;
this included representatives from the Veterans Administration,
the National Institutes of Health, NASA, the Department of Trans-
portation, and the National Science Foundation. Its duties were
"to identify, assess, and seek to coordinate all Federal programs,
activities, and projects .... with respect to the conduct of re-
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search related to rehabilitation of handicapped individuals."
The role of NASA's representative was to consult and cooperate
with the Director of NIHR through the committee. Although these
organizational arrangements offer a potential for assisting NASA
f	 in its determination of priorities, realistic assessment must
wait; so far the committee has met only twice.
Up until now NASA has assured itself of the significance of
its undertakings through the requirement that mission agencies
provide co-funding. The rationale was twofold: (1) the approval
of agencies having direct contact with potential users would have
potent feedback value; (2) a financial stake in the endeavor would
motivate mission agencies to active participation and ultimate
adoption of the product being developed.
Internally, NASA carries out its programmatic activities via
three Biomedical Application Teams, located at Stanford University,
Research Triangle, and University of Wisconsin. Set up to serve
as liaison bewteen NASA and the medical community, these teams
operate on what appears to be a demand-pull model; i.e., doctors,
therapists, and the like come to them with their needs. Concep-
tually, the Team assists in defining the problem and formulates
a problem statement to be circulated throughout NASA to elicit
ideas for possible solutions. If the solution meets NASA's cri-
teria -- that the product be new, significant, and utilizing
aerospace technology, a formal proposal, Research and Technology
Objectives and Plans (RTOP), is submitted to NASA headquarters
for approval and funding. Actually, the process is more accurately
characterized by the technology-push model, with certain tech-
nologies perceived as having promise. Thus, the chain of events
is started. One preliminary, partial, and tentative view of the
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way applications are chosen for development raises some questions
as to whether the present mechanism is optimal for engaging the
full potential of NASA's technical assistance to the elderly and
handicapped. It is interesting to note that the technologies
which are finally chosen for development emanate not from some
carefully constructed program plan but from a random assortment
of chance factors, not least among which are the professional
interests of members of the Biomedical Application Teams.
Of no small significance is the matter of magnitude of the
effort. There are the usual criticisms on the part of medical
researchers that grants are too small to attract first class
people and programs or that the Technology Utilization Program
does not occupy a position of high prestige on NASA's own roster.
There is, however, another, more fundamental area of concern
about size. This stems from funding limitations that foster a
preference for a variety of short-term projects requiring a low
level of support. But this pattern may run counter to what has
been recognized as the shape and dimensions of the need. The
situation takes on the aspect of a chicken-and-egg dilemma.
In a 1973 report, Study of Aerospace Technology in the Civilian
Biomedical Field, the Committee on the Interplay of Engineering
with Biology and Medicine of the National Academy of Engineering
stated:
In the area of health care delivery there are
rather significant and somewhat universal prob-
lems faced by those providing services and
functions. ...if the problem is of sufff.cient
impact it may well prove worthwhile to expend
considerable funds and considerable time to
accomplish the transfer of technology.
Italics added,
V
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While NASA's internal review process serves as the screen-
ing mechanism for funding projects, the criteria applied (i.e.
that the product be new, significant, and space-derived) do not
provide a useful answer to our second question, "How do market
characteristics affect the choices available to consumers? In
fact, on retrospect, the question as phrased carries several as-
sumptions not supported by subsequent research. "The market"
was assumed to be an entity having objective reality and thus
identifiable in the process linking technology to user.
There is actually an unmapped middle ground between the
providers and the recipients of a given technology; this is
buffeted by many forces and peopled by many actors. The gigantic
HMO (Health Maintenance Organization) structure must be reckoned
with. With the myriad of middle men, brokers, and agents acting
for the elderly and handicapped persons, it is virtually impossible
to make definitive statements about "the market". What its
characteristics are depends in major part on how and by whom it
has been delimited.	 Whether, as currently conceived, it is
responsive or even relevant to the needs of the elderly and the
handicapped is conjectural. This might be an area for fruitful
future research: can a reasonably faithful representation of the
user need structure be incorporated in the model? It is important
to ask who is the user and how can input from him be elicited and
accomodated.
The factor of commercialization in the technology transfer
is given more lipservice than serious attention. And this may be
not only understandable but commendable, since bio-medical devices
are intended for a very limited and specialized market. With the
market potential of an innovation the result of a complex and not
always predictable interp lay of many factors, commercialization in
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this area is uniquely difficult. Manufacturers must cope with
small, specialized, and uncertain markets, often dependent on
decisions by third-party payers; they must deal with product
safety requirements, arrangements for servicing and repairs,
and, perhaps, modifications to suit a particular user's needs.
Given the special character of the products and the market,
it may well be that issues of subsidy be given serious attention.
The questions raised in the third part of the study as pro-
posed can only be answered in the future. They imply a different
model from the one which currently describes the process, in that
implicit in them is a stronger role for users, a better understand-
ing of the problems of handicapped and elderly persons, and improved
organizational arrangements for accomplishing goals set forward by
policy but nut implemented practically. How the user requirements
can enter into the process and what effect this would have on it
are questions of primary importance. It is from them that answers
would flow; this suggests that the next step should be in the
direction of modifying the model.
